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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MAVOR JEAN CARNES, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs .. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
Case No. 18370 
CLIFF CARJ.~ES , . . 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted in the 
Third District Court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The respondent brought an action upon a foreign judgment 
against the appellant in the Third District Court. The appel-
lant contested the action. Respondent first filed a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings which was in part denied. Later, on 
March 5, 1982, the court granted the respondent's "motion for 
judgment." On April 5, 1982, the appellant filed his notice of 
appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the summary judgment and 
a remand for trial on the disputed factual issues. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The case began on April 28, 1981, when the respondent filed 
a complaint against the appellant based upon a foreign judgment. 
In the complaint the respondent alleged that the Florida court 
which entered judgment on November 10, 1980, had acquired per-
sonal jurisdiction over the aopellant by means of personal ser-
vice (R-3, paragraph #4). The appellant filed an answer which, 
among other allegations, denied that he had been served and affir-
matively alleged that the Florida court lacked jurisdiction to 
enter the judgment. 
On August 25, 1981, the respondent filed a motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings (R7-17). The Court did not grant the motion 
because no proof was presented that the appellant had in fact 
been served in the Florida action (R-21-22) . 
On January 20, 1982, the respondent filed what she styled 
as a "motion for judgment" pursuant to Rule 12C of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, again claiming that the appellant had been 
properly served in the Florida action (R-23) . Attached to the 
motion was a return of service which purports to show that the 
appellant was personally served at 1554 West 8155 South ~73 on 
October 22, 1980 with the process which led to the judgment (R-26). 
However, an examination of the exhibit shows it was not prepared 
until May 22, 1981, six months after the judgment, and according 
to the Clerk's stamp in the left corner, was not filed in Florida 
-2-
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until November 20, 1981, some one year and ten days after the 
entry of judgment and some two months after the Utah court ruled 
such a return would be a prerequisite for any judgment. 
The Court which heard the "motion for judgment" ordered 
that it be continued without date to enable the respondent to 
secure additional proof of service (R-30, 36). Respondent then 
filed an affidavit from the same deputy who prepared the May 22, 
1981 return, only in this affidavit the deputy claimed to have 
served the appellant at his work address, 4950 South 8400 West, 
Salt Lake City, Utah (R-32, 33). The Court then gave the appel-
lant five days to respond to the new affidavit (R-35). 
The appellant then filed his own affidavit alleging that 
he had never resided at 1554 West 8155 South #73, the first 
place at which he was alleged to have been served, that he had 
never been served at work and that he had never been served at 
all (R-46). The Court then considered memoranda submitted by 
the parties (R-42, 48, 56) and entered judgment on March 5, 1982 
(R-59). 
ARGUMENT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD 
NOT H.~VE BEEN GRANTED 
Summary judgment was inappropriate in this case both as 
a matter of fact and and as a matter of law. A clear issue exists 
-3-
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as to the central fact in the case, whether the appellant was 
served. In addition, under Florida law no judgment can be entered 
without proof of service, yet here the proof was not prepared 
for six months after the entry of judgment and was not filed until 
more than a year later. However, before these factual and legal 
issues are explored in greater depth, it is first necessary to 
determine what type of judgment the court entered. 
The determination of what type of judgment was entered is 
necessary because the respondent styled her motion only as a 
"motion for judgmentu and the court's judgment did not clarify 
the type. The motion was made pursuant to Rule 12C, U.R.C.P., 
thus it apparently began as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
However, the court did not limit its inquiry to the pleadings 
but rather considered the return of service exhibit, the affidavit 
of the deputy who claimed to have made the service, and the 
affidavit of the defendant who denied service. Where the court 
considers matters outside of the pleadings on a motion made 
pursuant to Rule 12, " ... the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 ... ," Rule 12, 
U.R.C.P., Strand v. Associated Students of u. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 
(Utah 1977). Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that the 
judgment which was entered was a summary judgment. 
The principles which guide a court in determining whether 
to enter sununary judgment are well known. "To sustain a summary 
judgment, the pleadings, evidence, admissions and inferences 
therefrom, viewed most favorably to the loser, must show that 
-4-
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there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the winner 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Such showing must 
preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable possibility that 
the loser could win if given a trial", Frederick May & Cornoany v. 
Dunn, 13 U.2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962). " ... It takes only one 
sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other 
side of the controversy and create an issue of fact ... ,!' Hollbrook 
Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). An application 
of these principles to the 9resent appeal discloses one of the 
reasons summary judgment was inappropriate. 
The respondent's evidence to support service may have been 
sufficient alone to preclude summary judgment. In September, 1981, 
the court told the respondent it would not grant judgment absent 
sufficient proof that the appellant was served. Curiously enough, 
in November, 1981, two months later and more than a year after the 
entry of judgment a return of service appeared for the first time 
in the Florida file. The return wasostensLbly prepared by a Utah 
deputy sheriff six months after the entry of judgment and then was 
not filed for another six months. In it the deputy professes to 
have served the appellant at a certain residential address in 
western Salt Lake County. Later, when the court pressed the 
respondent for further proof of service, the same depQty filed an 
affidavit in which he claimed to have served the appellant at a 
completely different business address. These confused and odd 
facts offered in support of service are squarely opposed by the 
appellant's affidavit. In it, he claims to have never been served. 
He also states that he never lived at the residence where the 
-5-
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deputy first claimed to have served him and when the deputy 
changed his story to claim he served him at work, it turned 
out that the appellant was not at work that week. The appellant's 
"one sworn statement" created a clear material issue of fact, 
whether he was served, which should have prevented the lower court 
from entering summary judgment. 
The materiality of the disputed fact cannot be questioned. 
It is fundamental that without service of process there can be no 
jurisdiction to enter a judgment, Shepherd v. Kellv, 2 Fla. 634 
(1849). In Florida, where this particular judgment arose, the 
defendant is permitted to raise lack of appropriate service as a 
defense even where a valid sheriff's return has been filed provided 
that he bear the burden of persuading the court by clear and 
convincing evidence that service did not occur, Mcintosh v. Webbeler, 
106 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1958). Thus the dispute presented by 
this appeal is "material." 
Summary judgment was improper here not only because of the 
dispute as to the facts but as a matter of Florida law. As has 
been seen previously, the return of service on the Florida process 
was not created until some six months after the entry of judgment 
and was not filed for more than a year after the entry of judgment. 
Thus, at the time the judgment was entered proof of any kind that 
the appellant had been served did not even exist. In Klosenski v. 
Flaherty, 116 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 1959), the Court held that it was 
the service of the writ and not the sheriff's return which gave 
the court jurisdiction but at the same time it held, "the court 
-6-
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has not jurisdiction to proceed further in the cause unless and 
until proof of valid service has been made," id., at 769, and 
concluded that the action would lie dormant until proper proof 
was made. Therefore, in the present case, under unequivocal 
Florida law, the court which entered the judgment "lacked 
jurisdiction to proceed in the cause" at the time judgment was 
entered. Thus the judgment in Florida was void as a matter of 
law and was equally void when suit was broughtupon it here in 
Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment was inappropriate as a matter of fact and 
as a matter of law because the fact of service was in dispute 
and the Florida court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment. 
The judgment should be reversed and the case remanded to the 
District Court. 
DATED this 4_3 day of June, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E1'WARD K • BRASS ._,, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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